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26 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr.
Deputy Director of Security

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SUBJECT: Admittance of Support Personnel
to DDI Special Center

1. The TALENT Control Officer/CIA has been requested to concur in the attached paper on the above subject prepared by the Deputy Director of Security for the DDI.

2. The TCO/CIA nonconcurs in the proposal of this paper for the following reasons:

a. The TALENT and TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Systems are systems which have been for a considerable period of time administered under inter-agency agreements and under the direct supervision responsibility of the DCI. All provisions of those security systems and adaptations therefrom have been subject to inter-agency agreement either by the United States Intelligence Board or by COMOR on behalf of the Board. If the system is to function properly, it is necessary that the rules be applied to all agencies and that no agency shall unilaterally develop procedures for its own convenience. It is the responsibility of the TCO/CIA with the assistance of the TALENT Security Officer/CIA to monitor these systems on behalf of the Director. If the proposed procedures were to be put into effect, they should be applied to all the agencies, not just in CIA.

b. The paper gives no indications of the numbers of personnel to be included under this arrangement though the terms "selected," "certain limited," and "small number" give the impression they are but

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a few. If so, a special clearance is not warranted. If it is a large number, then the impression is gained that this is a device to avoid clearance statistics and reporting on them as evidenced by the last sentence of paragraph 2.

c. The element of convenience in avoiding escort responsibility appears to be a strong factor in this proposal. If the number is indeed limited as the paper suggests, then the escort responsibility would not appear to be great. The inconvenience of an escort is a burden which OSA and the office of the undersigned have endured for a very long time.

d. The undersigned is not at all impressed with the argument in paragraph 3 e which suggests that the green indicator will be a warning to cleared personnel in the Center as to the limitations of the security of the green H badge. We assume that the personnel in a center are constantly checking the letters on badges. I do not believe this to be true at all.



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TALENT Control Officer/CIA

Attachment: (w/orig only)
Memo to DDI, same subject.

Copy 1 DD/SEC
2 DD/SEC
3 TSO/CIA
4 TCO/CIA
5 TCO/CIA

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